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According to a familiar picture, two elements are needed for guilt in 
most common law offences: the action, the actus reus, and the associated 
mental element, the mens rea. Neither is sufficient for the offence on its 
own. So a murder requires a killing—a homicide—and also an intention—
malice aforethought as it is traditionally, and misleadingly, termed. And 
it is natural to think that these two elements can obtain independently. 
Thus there can be a killing that is not accompanied by the relevant 
intention—that is what happens in cases of accidental killing. Conversely, 
there can be an intention without a killing—that is what happens in 
attempted murder, and also in cases where so little is actually done that 
we do not even have an attempt.
Natural though this picture is, I think that we should reject it. I don’t 
suggest that we should give up the notions of actus reus and mens rea. 
But I do suggest that we make the best sense of the law if we reject the 
idea that they are independent. The central idea I will develop here is 
that a crime like murder cannot be understood as the conjunction of a 
self-standing mental element and a self-standing physical element. Instead 
we should think of it as involving an intentional action—murder—which 
involves both elements inseparably intertwined.
My argument for this proceeds by way of an account of the puzzles 
that arise if we think of mens rea and actus reus as separable. One account 
concerns the notion just mentioned, that of attempt. Why is it—a much 
discussed question—that in many jurisdictions, attempt, even a completed 
attempt where the perpetrator thinks that they have done enough, is often 
punished less severely than success?1 After all, if we have two independent 
1 See R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts (Oxford: OUP 1997), ch. 4, for discussion both of 
how attempt is punished in various jurisdictions, and of possible justifications for it.
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elements, the mens rea and the actus reus, it might seem, whether from 
considerations of natural justice or of deterrence, that it is the mens rea 
that matters; whether the act is successful or not is just down to luck. 
But if the mens rea is the same in each case, then the punishment should 
be the same. Yet we are, I think, naturally resistant to that conclusion. It 
isn’t just that this is what the law happens to be. We think that this is 
what the law should be. We think that successful offences should be 
punished more severely than mere attempts; we are more inclined to 
morally condemn those who succeed than those who merely attempt; 
we feel more guilty about our own immoral successes than our mere 
attempts, and so on.
A second problem concerns the nature of mens rea. I said before that 
the traditional characterization of the mens rea for murder as malice 
aforethought is highly misleading: it has long been accepted that, as one 
authority puts it ‘the “malice” may have in it nothing really malicious; 
and need never be really “aforethought” ’.2 Less misleadingly the mental 
element is standardly thought of as an intention. But that too is far from 
a perfect characterization. In many crimes a person can be guilty even 
though they lack what we would normally think of as an intention to 
commit the crime. So, to continue with the example of murder, if the 
death of the victim is sufficiently clearly foreseen by the accused, that 
may be sufficient to constitute the mens rea.3 Moreover, even if the 
accused does not expect the victim to die—if they would indeed be 
surprised by their death—an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm is 
sufficient for the mens rea for murder.4 And for many other crimes, 
though not in England for murder, recklessness is sufficient. How 
should we understand this? One possibility is that these various different 
criteria have no real unity: they have just been put together for pragmatic 
expediency. But the arguments that courts have used have typically been 
couched in terms of something like the development of the true nature 
of the crime, and of what it is, not to have an intention to murder, but 
to murder intentionally. This is reflected too in a common understanding 
2 C.S. Kenny, in J.C. Smith, Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, 9th edition (London: 
Butterworths, 1999), p. 348.
3 Quite how likely it is foreseen as, and whether this should be a subjective or an objective 
standard, has been an issue of ongoing debate in the courts. Since Woollin [1989] AC82, [1998] 
Crim LR 890, the standard requirement in the UK is a subjective one of virtual certainty.
4 Moloney [1985] 1 AER 1025.
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of what it is to do something intentionally. If you ask ordinary people 
whether the foreseen consequences of an agent’s acts are things that they 
do intentionally, in many circumstances they will say that they are; a 
point to which we shall return.
A third problem arises when we put these two issues together. 
Although, as we have seen, the expectation that the victim will die is 
enough for the mens rea of murder, if the victim doesn’t in fact die, it is 
not enough for the mens rea of attempted murder. (At least, not in 
England, and in most US jurisdictions; Scottish law is rather different, 
as is that of the State of Colorado.) Similarly, whilst intending to cause 
grievous bodily harm is sufficient for the mens rea for murder, attempting 
to cause grievous bodily harm is not sufficient for the mens rea for 
attempted murder.5 And whilst recklessness is sufficient for the mens rea 
of a crime like rape, it is not sufficient for attempted rape. Again, this 
might be thought to result from expediency. But again that doesn’t seem 
quite right. Attempting to do something that one believes will result in 
a killing is not the same as intending to kill, and the law is right to treat 
them as different.6
So we are left with a puzzle. The idea I want to explore here is that we 
can make some progress on solving it by thinking of the relation between 
the mens rea and the actus reus in a very different way. Rather than con-
ceiving of them as two independent elements which come together to 
constitute an offence, we should think of the offence as a single primitive 
notion, though one which entails (or presupposes) these two elements. 
Our way of understanding the mens rea involved in murder is as the 
mental state that is common to those who perpetrate it. The mental state 
of those guilty of attempted murder is a different thing, that of someone 
who unsuccessfully tries to kill.
5 Smith and Horgan, Criminal Law, p. 307. See R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency, and Criminal 
Liability (Oxford: Blackwells, 1990) and Duff, Criminal Attempts for illuminating discussion. 
In many ways the argument of this paper can be seen as an attempt to provide a theoretical 
underpinning for the position defended there. I hope that the main argument of this paper is 
also consistent with the position taken by Gideon Yaffe in his Attempts (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 
although my own view on why we should not distinguish tryings from attempts is somewhat 
different (see n.20 below). Yaffe’s subsequent ‘Criminal Attempts’, Yale Law Journal 124 
(2014): 92–156, also traces many of the difficulties in standard discussions on criminal 
attempt to the view that mens rea and actus reus can be identified independently; see especially 
pp. 118–20.
6 Though whether or not they should be punished in the same way, or indeed even subject 
to the same conviction, is a further question. See Yaffe, Attempts, pp. 119ff.
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Such ideas may seem mysterious, but in suggesting this I am following 
a path that has become very familiar in many areas of philosophy. The 
main ideas have gone under various different names—‘externalism’, 
‘disjunctivism’—and have been proposed with various different emphases. 
Here I want to take as my model the ‘Knowledge First’ account offered 
by Timothy Williamson.7 So I start by outlining that.
KNOWLEDGE
How should we conceive of knowledge? A traditional approach held it 
to be built out of the conjunction of three different elements: belief 
(something internal), truth (something external), and justification 
(either external or internal, depending on the account). But in a justly 
celebrated piece Gettier showed that this couldn’t be right.8 To use an 
example first offered by Russell: agents are surely justified in forming 
beliefs about the time by looking at a station clock. If the clock is telling 
the right time, they will have true justified beliefs. But suppose that the 
clock has, unprecedentedly, stopped, and someone glances at it exactly 
twelve hours after it stops, when it happens to be telling the right time. 
They will form a justified true belief that will not be knowledge.
Once we have the recipe other examples are easy to create. The initial 
response from philosophers was to try to give more conditions: knowledge 
is belief + truth + justification + something else. The outcome was not 
edifying. More complex accounts brought more complex counter-
examples, until many began to doubt that an effective analysis would 
ever be given. Why should it? Analysis must stop somewhere. Why not 
think that the idea of knowledge, fundamental as it is, is primitive? It 
seems to be grasped by monkeys who cannot grasp the concept of belief.9 
Why not think that it is one of our cognitive starting points?
Williamson’s knowledge-first account draws just such a conclusion. 
Knowledge should be taken as a starting point. Part of the justification 
for this is simple induction on the failure of attempted analyses. But that 
is a consideration in favour of thinking that knowledge is unanalysable. 
7 Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), chs. 1–3.
8 Edmund L. Gettier, ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis 23 (1963): 121–3.
9 Drew Marticorena et al., ‘Monkeys Represent Others’ Knowledge but not their Beliefs’, 
Developmental Science 14 (2011): 1406–16. It used to be thought that the same was true of 
young children, but that is now in debate.
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Here we are concerned with the rather different claim that it is prime. 
So let us first get clear on the difference between the two.
Neither notion is quite as straightforward as it might seem at first 
glance, and nor is their relation. Start with analysability. Take it as a 
two-place property and it’s fairly clear: a notion is analysable iff it can be 
explained in some target vocabulary. That is what early proponents of 
the approach wanted to do: everything legitimate had to be analysed 
into the language of physics, or of sense-data or the like. But taken as a 
one-place property, and it is much less clear what constitutes a successful 
analysis. Everything can be analysed in terms of itself, so that is no good. 
There has to be some idea of a simpler vocabulary in which the analysis 
must be couched.
Now take primeness. Williamson introduced the term to this area, so 
he gets to say what it means. He defines prime conditions as those that 
are not composite; and composite conditions as those that consist of the 
conjunction of an internal condition with an external environmental 
condition. We can literally think of an internal condition as internal to 
the subject’s skin. We could generalize the notion to say that a condition 
is composite relative to any two exclusive sets of conditions iff it is a 
conjunction of one drawn from each, but Williamson’s initial charac-
terization is good enough for us here.
Distinguish this account of primeness from the very different claim 
that prime concepts must provide the blocks from which all others are 
built. (Such a claim might perhaps be motivated by an over-literal parallel 
with the mathematical notion, and hence with the Fundamental 
Theorem of Arithmetic.) While it may be true that all analysable concepts 
are built out of unanalysable ones, there is no reason to think that prime 
concepts will be fundamental. I will make no such assumption.10
What is the relation between being prime and being unanalysable? It 
might seem that if something is not prime it will be analysable, since its 
decomposition will constitute an analysis. But that depends on whether 
the decomposition is sufficiently distinct from the target notion to 
count as one. Suppose that someone wanted to characterize being red in 
terms of reflecting a certain frequency of light and being judged to be red. 
Such a characterization is composite, but it is plausibly not an analysis 
10 Note that, despite the ‘knowledge first’ slogan, and his gloss of belief in terms of knowledge, 
Williamson himself offers no such analytic claim: “a full-blown exact conceptual analysis of 
believes in terms of knows is too much to expect” (Knowledge and Its Limits, p. 47).
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since the internal condition, being judged to be red, itself makes refer-
ence to the very notion of being red.11 Conversely a condition can be 
analysable but not prime: it may be that the analysis does not split into 
the conjunction of an internal and an external condition (causal accounts 
of knowledge are like that: we shall return to them shortly). Primeness 
and unanalysability are independent notions.
Williamson offers a general argument for thinking that knowledge is 
not prime using a mix-and-match strategy. If knowledge really could be 
factored into these two elements, then it should be possible to take any 
two cases in which a certain thing is known, and come up with a new 
case of knowledge by combining the internal element from one and the 
external from the other. Yet this cannot in general be done. So the two 
elements are not independent.
Here is an adaptation of one example from the many that Williamson 
offers:
First Case. Suppose that Judy wants to know whether a party she 
missed was crowded. She gets testimony from two informants, A and 
B. A is trustworthy and Judy trusts him. He tells her that the party 
was indeed crowded and she believes him. B in contrast is utterly 
untrustworthy and wisely Judy puts no store in his testimony, but for 
reasons of his own in this case he truthfully tells her that the party was 
crowded (perhaps he is trying to make her regret having missed it). 
Since A is trustworthy, and is speaking the truth, and Judy accepts his 
testimony and comes to believe that the party was crowded, Judy 
gains knowledge that it was.
Second Case. This is just like the first, except that the characteristics 
of A and B are reversed, as are Judy’s attitudes to them. This time it 
is B who is trustworthy, and it is B whom Judy trusts. Again Judy 
gains knowledge, but this time from B.
Third case. This is constructed from the first two cases by taking the 
 features internal to Judy from the first, and the features external to her 
11 See Christopher Peacocke, ‘Colour Concepts and Colour Experience’, Synthese 66 
(1984): 365–81 and Michael Smith, ‘Peacocke on Red and Red’, Synthese 68 (1986): 559–76 
for the genuine debate here. There the account of redness under discussion is simply in terms 
of being judged to be red. That too is composite, but trivially so, since it consists of the con-
junction of the internal state with any external state whatsoever; I gave a non-trivially composite 
version to avoid muddying the waters.
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from the second. So Judy trusts A and distrusts B; yet it is B who is 
trustworthy and A who is not. Once again Judy forms the true belief 
that the party was crowded, but this time, since her belief is formed 
on the testimony of an utterly untrustworthy informant, it isn’t 
knowledge.12
The Gettier cases showed us that in cases of knowledge there is a connec-
tion between what is known and the state of mind of the knower—
intuitively this is what fails in cases like that of the station clock where 
the true belief is formed by chance. The mix-and-match argument shows 
us just how intimate that connection is: we cannot factor knowledge 
into independent internal and external elements. Whether we have a 
case of knowledge depends on the relations between those elements. 
Knowledge is prime.
Once we accept that knowledge is prime, we have to give up the idea 
that it is simply the conjunction of belief and something external. 
However, we do not have to deny that knowing entails belief. Indeed 
Williamson suggests that we can use the notion of knowledge to provide 
a rough gloss on belief: to believe a proposition is to treat it as if one knew 
it. But we cannot build a case of knowledge by adding truth to belief. 
(Can we turn a case of knowledge into one of false belief by subtracting 
truth? Yes, but only if that is understood temporally, not modally. If 
knowledge exists it can be lost because the world changes. But we cannot 
arrive at a case of knowledge by taking a case of false belief and then 
supposing that the thing believed had been true all along.)
MURDER
Now we turn from knowledge to criminal guilt. I suggest that the two 
are very similar. In particular, the relation between the mens rea and the 
actus reus in a crime like murder is much the same as that between the 
internal and the external elements in a case of knowledge. To see this, 
start by considering something like a Gettier case for murder:
D intends to kill V with poisonous tablets. The police have been 
watching; they remove the tablets and substitute some others that are 
apparently harmless. It turns out though that they contain a food 
colouring, to which V is, remarkably, and unknown to them, highly 
allergic. D gives them to V, who takes them and dies.
12 Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits, p. 72.
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Is D intuitively guilty of murder? I can find no actual cases of quite this 
form.13 However, variations on such cases are standard in law exams, 
and those who mark them tell me that the expected answer is ‘No’. The 
gap between D’s intention and the actual killing is too great and too 
accidental; in this it resembles the case of the stopped station clock.14 
D may be guilty of attempted murder, but not of murder.
Working backwards, we can construct from this a Williamson-style 
mix-and-match sequence:
First Case. D intends to kill with his own poisonous tablets; the 
police do not intervene; D gives V the tablets; V dies; D is guilty of 
murder. In this case, D is internally just like in the case we started 
with, but externally things are different.
Second Case. D intends to kill V; but he believes that the police are 
watching, and that they plan to substitute tablets. He also believes 
that V is allergic to the tablets they would substitute. Thinking this 
the perfect way to avoid liability for murder he allows things to take 
their course, and gives the substituted tablets to V. V dies. D is guilty 
of murder (though it would be doubtless hard to convict). In this case 
D is internally different to the case we started with, but externally 
things are the same.15
Third Case. The third case is just our original case, the same as the first 
case with respect to D’s internal features, and the same as the second 
with respect to the features external to D. Yet here D is not guilty.
13 There are some cases that involve examples of more or less deviant causal chains. In 
Thabo-Meli vs R [1954] 1WLR the victim died from exposure having been rolled off a cliff 
after the defendants thought they had killed him; there the Privy Council reasonably ruled that 
it would be ‘much too refined a ground of judgement’ to distinguish the initial assault from the 
subsequent treatment of the victim (thanks to John Gardner for the reference). Nyuzi and 
Kudemera vs Republic (Malawi) [1967] African Law Reports 249 involves a case (discussed in A. 
Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 12–21) in which 
a ‘trial by ordeal’ using an apparently harmless potion led to the death of four people who had 
been suspected of witchcraft; but there the charge, of which the accused was found guilty, was of 
witchcraft, not of murder, so the issue of the deviant causal chain was not germane to the finding.
14 The actual legal doctrine may be muddied by the doctrine of transferred intent (or 
transferred malice), although, since it is the same person involved, it should probably not be. 
Even if it were, I should be inclined to think that not so significant. In contrast to the other 
legal doctrines that we have been discussing, transferred intent is a doctrine that strikes many 
as artificial: Lord Mustill described it as ‘useful enough to yield rough justice’ while lacking ‘any 
sound intellectual basis’ [1998] 1 Cr App R 91 at 106.
15 Why not say that D knew about V’s allergy, and the police plan? I don’t want to assume 
that there could be a difference in knowledge without a difference in the external circum-
stances (though I don’t think that Williamson’s position requires this).
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Is this so surprising? After all, it is a standard position, both in action 
theory and in the law, that causation matters: the mental state must 
cause the behaviour in the right sort of way. Are we simply seeing that 
mixing and matching disrupts the causal relationships, giving rise to 
deviant causal chains? I think that this is to understate the force of the 
challenge. The deviant causal chain approach encourages the thought 
that if we could understand the causal relation properly we could go 
back to a more complex conjunctive account. Murder = mens rea + actus 
reus + the right causal relation between them. The parallel attempt to 
reductively analyse the right causal relation has been made in both epis-
temology and in action theory, and in both it has failed dismally. No one 
has been able to specify the right kind of relation except by saying that 
it is whatever is needed to give rise to cases of knowledge or of action, 
and there is no reason to think that we will do any better in the case of 
murder. However, the problem with such an approach is not simply that 
it fails to provide a reductive account. It is that once one says that the 
relation is whatever is needed for knowledge, or for action, it is far from 
obvious that there will be a causal relation, even a non-reductively char-
acterized one, that does the job (in cases of knowledge within abstract 
domains like mathematics, it is highly implausible that there is). While, 
in cases of action at least, there must be causation involved—Davidson 
showed us that—there is no reason to think that the causal relations 
constitute an independent third factor, rather than simply being further 
implications. Indeed it is unclear that we must accept that there is a 
non-reductive relation of any kind that fills a third place. All we can be 
sure of, in the case of knowledge, is that there is a belief, and the content 
of the belief is true, and that this is a case of knowledge; and in the case 
of action, that there is an appropriate mental state, and an appropriate 
bodily movement, and that this is a case of action. The primeness 
account provides an explanation of why we should be sceptical of the 
whole approach, of constructions using three conjuncts as well as of two.
My conclusion then is that, as with knowledge, so with murder: it is 
prime. It cannot be factorized into internal and external elements. But 
in some ways the conclusion is even more radical than it is for knowledge. 
As we saw, the claim that knowledge is prime is consistent with the idea 
that knowledge entails belief; and if, as Williamson suggests, to believe 
a proposition is to treat it as if one knew it, we have an explanation for 
the entailment (to know a proposition is certainly to treat it as if one 
knew it). So both cases of knowledge and of false belief can be seen to 
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have something—belief—in common. It seems unlikely that there is 
anything similar that can be said to unify cases of murder with cases of 
attempted murder. We cannot say in a parallel way that to attempt to 
murder someone is for it to be as if one actually murdered them. For 
attempts do not need to be completed attempts. And even apparently 
completed attempts will often differ from actual murders, since the 
latter will involve monitoring of how things are going, with a readiness 
to make further interventions if needed. Murder is an ongoing process. 
Even a frenzied attack typically takes time, involving different steps 
mediated by knowledge of what is happening—Is the victim escaping? 
Are they still moving? Is someone coming who can help them?—and 
finishing only when the victim is dead. An attempt to murder, even one 
that is in a sense complete, need not be like that.
Let me make one further clarification. In the Introduction to 
Knowledge and Its Limits Williamson pointed out a possible parallel 
between knowledge and desire; in subsequent work he has replaced talk 
of desire with talk of intention.16 The idea there is that one can parallel 
the relation between knowing that p, believing that p, and p being true, 
with the relation between performing the action of φ-ing, intending to 
φ, and one’s φ-ing being successful. That is not what is being proposed 
here. Williamson’s parallel is between two sets of schemas, those on the 
knowledge side substituting a sentence for ‘p’, and those on the action 
side substituting a verb phrase for ‘φ’. In contrast I am arguing for a 
parallel between the verb ‘to know’, and a variety of other action verbs, 
typified by ‘to murder’. Mine is not a schematic proposal in the way that 
Williamson’s is; it does not apply to each possible substitution for ‘φ’. To 
see whether verbs have the similarities to ‘to know’ that I am interested 
in we need to examine them individually. Non-intentional verbs like ‘to 
drop’ and ‘to kill’ do not; we turn to this distinction next.
The mens rea for Murder
My suggestion then is that in a case of murder the mens rea is essentially 
connected with the killing itself. It follows that the mens rea for murder, 
and the mens rea for attempted murder, are bound to be different. The issue 
16 Timothy Williamson, ‘Acting on Knowledge’, in J.A. Carter, E. Gordon, and B. Jarvis 
(eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind (Oxford: OUP, 2017). Yair Levy 
has developed similar ideas: see ‘Intentional Action First’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
91 (2013): 705–18.
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is thus not why they are different; it is why they take the particular 
different forms that they do. Let’s turn to that.
I have talked so far about criminal guilt. But the discussion can 
equally—perhaps preferably—be rephrased in terms of action. There are 
certain action verbs which we can think of as essentially intentional, in 
that they are only applicable if the agent is in a certain state of mind. 
Those expressing what have historically been the central offences of the 
criminal law are like this—to murder, to steal, to rape, to assault, to 
defraud—as are many others that have little place in the law—to borrow, 
to lie, to compliment. But other action verbs are not: one can kill someone 
or cause their death, drop something, wound someone, damage some-
thing, without needing to be in any particular mental state. Some offences 
make use of these verbs: causing death by dangerous driving for instance. 
And there are some offences—most obviously those involving negligence 
where it is distinguished from recklessness—that presuppose the absence 
of certain states of mind (though I cannot think of any ordinary verbs of 
action that do).
As a first thought, we can distinguish the intentional verbs from the 
others by saying that they can’t readily be modified by the adverbs ‘unin-
tentionally’ or ‘inadvertently’. One can unintentionally kill someone or 
drop something; but there isn’t a straightforward way in which one can 
unintentionally murder or steal. (Of course, if someone were to say 
something like that, we’d make some sense of what they said; but things 
would have to be stretched.) It is a plausible thesis that all intentional 
action verbs are, like ‘murder’ prime, though I shan’t defend that here. 
I’ll keep the focus on murder.
Understanding murder as an action verb, what might the mens rea for 
it be? I said at the outset that talk of an intention to kill is too restrictive. 
Recent philosophical discussions of intentions have identified them with 
plans: to have an intention to do something is to structure one’s activities 
to try to ensure that it comes about, modifying those activities, and perhaps 
one’s plans, if need be. That leaves space for a foreseen but unintended 
outcome, an outcome that one is not trying to bring about—one would 
not restructure one’s activities to ensure that it did—but that one none-
theless believes will result from one’s actions. But as we have seen, one can 
be guilty of murder if the death of the victim is a suitably closely foreseen 
consequence of one’s action; and that is quite compatible with one not 
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having had an intention to kill. So the mens rea for murder cannot be the 
intention to kill. A fortiori, it cannot be the intention to murder.
Our earlier discussion of primeness should have shown that there is a 
general problem of understanding the mens rea as an intention. Intention 
is plausibly an internal state (at least, putting aside questions of the exter-
nality of referring terms and the like). But if murder cannot be factored 
into an internal and an external state, then in looking to intentions to 
characterize the mens rea we are looking at the wrong sort of thing.
Rather than trying to identify an independent mental state as the 
mens rea, we should focus on the action—and hence the crime—of 
murder. The mens rea just is whatever state of mind is entailed by that. 
As we refine our understanding of murder, so we refine our understanding 
of the mens rea involved. Of course most of the changes there have been 
driven by the courts; but then murder is a well-established notion, and 
most of the recent revisions have concerned relatively minor issues 
around the degree of foresight and the like. For an example that concerns 
much more general involvement, and rather less from the courts, consider 
sexual harassment. This is a relatively recent notion, dating to the early 
1970s, and evolving considerably since then. What is the associated 
mens rea? That remains a matter of disagreement. Those who see it as 
a structural injustice tend to minimize the importance of the actor’s 
attitudes, but even they are unlikely to discount them altogether: the 
difference between harassment and legitimate behaviour will have some-
thing to do with the state of mind of the actor.
The central idea here is of our moral and legal concepts evolving as we 
think more about them, and as circumstances change. We may be more 
or less objectivist about this process—may model it more or less closely 
on the process of discovering natural kinds in science. I will leave that 
issue unexplored. What is important for us is that the relevant mens rea 
and actus reus are driven by our conception of the crime, and not the 
other way around. We do not start with an independent conception of 
the wrongful intention and build the moral or legal concept from that.
To deny that the mens rea for an offence should be understood as an 
intention is not, however, to deny that we can characterize the action 
that constitutes the offence as intentional. Indeed, talk of intentional 
action brings the external dimension that talk of intentions lacks. Just as 
knowing something entails, or presupposes, that the thing known is 
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true, so intentionally performing some action obviously entails or pre-
supposes that one performs that action. This is more promising.
If we switch to intentional actions, then we have two natural candi-
dates for the mens rea: intentionally killing, and intentionally murdering. 
But if I am right that ‘murder’ is an intentional verb, then the second of 
these is something of a pleonasm. So let us focus instead on the first.
It might be thought that once again talk of intentionally killing is too 
restrictive: if one merely foresees that an action will result in a killing, 
the killing is not intentional. But in a much discussed set of experi-
ments, Joshua Knobe found that most people don’t think that way, at 
least for closely related cases. Consider an executive who, motivated 
entirely by the goal of maximizing profit, embarks on a policy that he 
knows will also cause environmental damage. Does he intentionally 
harm the environment? Most people hold that he does. It seems likely 
then that they would say similar things about killing: that they would 
class a merely foreseen killing in such circumstances as intentional.17
Consider now the other half of Knobe’s findings. When asked to 
think about an otherwise identical case in which an executive embarks 
on a policy whose side effects are beneficial to the environment, most 
people hold that the executive does not intentionally help the environ-
ment. So how do we explain this? An obvious first thought is that bad 
foreseen consequences are counted as intentionally performed, whereas 
good foreseen consequences are not. However, another of Knobe’s 
experiments shows that that cannot be quite right either. A profit-driven 
executive whose actions have the side effect of violating a pernicious 
Nazi law—surely a good outcome in most subjects’ eyes—is judged to 
have acted intentionally; whereas a similarly driven executive whose 
actions have the bad effect of fulfilling the requirements of that law is 
not judged to have acted intentionally.18
So how should we explain these results? Elsewhere I have suggested 
that the asymmetry stems from a basic asymmetry in how we think 
about norms.19 On one side we are concerned with violation of a norm; 
17 Joshua Knobe, ‘The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk 
Psychology’, Philosophical Studies 130 (2006): 203–31.
18 Joshua Knobe, ‘Reason Explanation in Folk Psychology’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 
31 (2007): 90–107.
19 Richard Holton, ‘Norms and the Knobe Effect’, Analysis 70 (2010): 417–24. For related 
ideas, see Philip Pettit, The Robust Demands of the Good (Oxford: OUP, 2015), ch. 6. For some 
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on the other with following it. When it comes to violation of a norm, our 
concern is with whether someone is prepared to knowingly violate it. 
Intentional violation amounts to just that: acting with disregard for 
the norm. In contrast, intentionally following a norm requires more. 
It requires that one’s actions be guided by the norm. It is this asymmetry, 
I suggested, that explains Knobe’s findings. It is sufficient for intentionally 
harming the environment that one intentionally—i.e. knowingly—
violates a norm on harming it. But it is not sufficient for helping the 
environment that one merely acts in a way that conforms to a norm on 
helping it. To help it would require having one’s behaviour guided by 
that norm, in a way that the executive’s is not.20
Let us return to murder, for now we have the pieces needed for a more 
convincing account. If the norm is not to kill, then intentional killing 
results from knowingly violating that norm. And one can intentionally 
violate it either by acting on a successful intention to kill, or by acting in 
such a way that the killing is foreseen. Arguably one also violates it by 
behaving with insufficient care: by behaving recklessly, or by doing 
something else—inflicting grievous bodily harm, for instance—that 
brings a real risk of death. The arguments in the courts that have sur-
rounded these issues reflect, I suggest, our disagreement here.
Looked at in this way, the conditions on the mens rea for murder look 
as though they might be captured in the intuitive idea of intentionally 
killing. However, I’m still not sure that this is right. For obvious reasons, 
not every case of intentionally killing is a case of murder: not if it is done 
in self-defence, in legitimate warfare, as a result of provocation, and so 
on. Even if we insisted that in these cases the norm against killing is not 
violated, we surely cannot deny that they involve intentional killing. 
Nor does it help to say that since the mens rea is merely a necessary 
condition for the crime, it need not concern itself with the existence of 
defences. That doesn’t help because these defences incorporate mental 
elements themselves. Thus self-defence requires that the accused honestly 
plausible revisions to the account I offered, though in ways that I think are still compatible 
with what is said here, see B. Robinson, P. Stey, and M. Alfano ‘Reversing the Side-Effect 
Effect: The Power of Salient Norms’, Philosophical Studies 172 (2015): 177–206.
20 One issue that I failed to address in the earlier paper is whether, in order to act with 
disregard for a norm, one needs to be aware of it. In cases like killing it is inconceivable that a 
sane agent would not. A genuine failure to recognize the norm against killing would be 
grounds for an insanity defence.
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thinks the force used is both necessary and reasonable.21 The absence of 
such a belief is thus implicitly part of the mens rea for murder.
Perhaps then the best we can say is that the norm one violates is a 
norm against murder. Killings in legitimate warfare, in self-defence etc., 
don’t look like violations of that. But then any attempt to understand 
murder in terms of something else has been lost. There is a general point 
here. It might be thought that any intentional verb can be analysed in 
terms of intentionally performing some non-intentional action. That 
thought could be maintained even given my earlier arguments that 
verbs like ‘murder’ are prime: it might be thought that the mens rea can’t 
be characterized independently of the actus reus, but that the converse 
doesn’t hold. So provided we can identify the actus reus, and then talk 
about performing it intentionally, we can give a non-composite, but 
nonetheless reductive, account of the crime. I suggest though that that 
thesis is false too. I see no way to analyse murder in general as the 
intentional performance of some action that can be characterized in 
non-intentional terms. And the same, I suggest, goes for other core 
criminal acts. Consider, for instance, how one would try to characterize the 
relevant unintentional action for theft: it is certainly not adequate to say 
that it is intentional permanent removal of the property of another 
without their consent (and even that involves intentional vocabulary in 
its talk of consent).
The mens rea for Attempted Murder
Finally let us turn to the mens rea for attempted murder. I have argued 
that it cannot just be the mens rea for murder, since that cannot be dis-
entangled from the actus reus of the killing. So we need to think of it as 
a self-standing thing. Now it would be possible to have an offence under 
which someone would be guilty if they either intended to kill, and acted 
on that intention, or if they intended to do some other thing, acted on 
that intention, and foresaw that a killing would result, or if they intended 
to inflict grievous bodily harm, and acted on that. But such an offence 
really would be a medley. In most jurisdictions, the legal doctrine of 
attempt is much more unified.22
21 Williams (Gladstone) [1987] 78 Cr App R 276; Oatbridge [1984] 94 Cr App R 367.
22 Colorado’s might be an exception. For discussion, see Yaffe, Attempts, pp. 47ff.
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If we cannot understand attempt in terms of a successful crime minus 
success, we have to think instead of it as more self-standing. To get a grip 
on what it is we should start in the obvious place, with the ordinary idea 
of an attempt, that is, the ordinary idea of trying to do something.23 
Here I think we do need the idea of an intention, understood, as 
sketched above, as a plan. When one attempts to do something, the 
thing that one is attempting to do is what one has the intention to do. 
The intention brings a commitment to a certain course of action; the 
attempt is an attempt to fulfil that commitment.24 But then we can 
immediately see why mere foresight does not provide the mens rea for 
attempted murder, since mere foresight, whilst it might be enough for 
doing something intentionally, is not enough for an intention; one is 
not committed to bringing about what one merely foresees.25 Similarly, 
intentionally causing grievous bodily harm is not enough for an intention 
to kill, so attempting to cause grievous bodily harm is not enough for 
attempted murder.
There is of course more to say. The mere possession of an intention is 
not enough, for the idea of attempt is essentially action involving: one 
does not have an attempt until the plan has been put into motion. And 
I suspect that once again we have the structure with which we have 
become familiar: attempt entails an intention, and it entails action, but 
it cannot be factored into those two elements, since each is too intimately 
involved with the other. We have, not just intention, but intention-in-
action. Quite how far down the path of action someone needs to go 
23 See Yaffe, Attempts, ch. 3, and ‘Criminal Attempts’ for very helpful applications of the 
notion of trying to the doctrine of attempt. Note that Michael Bratman, Intention, Plans and 
Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 113ff. denies that trying 
to do something entails intending to do it. Like Yaffe I find that implausible. My own reason 
for doing so is rather different to Yaffe’s: I deny that forming inconsistent intentions has to be 
irrational. See my Willing, Wanting, Waiting (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), ch. 2.
24 See Yaffe, ‘Criminal Attempts’ for a sophisticated development of this idea. Yaffe there 
divides the relevant commitment into a commitment to promote, a commitment not to recon-
sider, and a commitment not to feel regret, which can hold independently. I’m not altogether 
convinced of the need for such sophistication—I suspect that even in the law we can get away 
with what Yaffe calls the ‘narrow sense’ of intention—but I shan’t argue for this here.
25 For the classic articulation of the distinction, see Bratman, Intention, Plans and 
Practical Reason, ch. 8. Note that while in the cases discussed above Knobe and others have 
found that ordinary subjects are prepared to say that agents who pollute with foresight pollute 
intentionally, they are much less ready to say that they have intentions to pollute; see 
H. McCann, ‘Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies’, Philosophical 
Psychology 18 (2005): 737–48.
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before mere preparation turns into enough of an attempt to be actionable 
is doubtless vague; but it certainly requires more than the possession of 
the intention alone.26
Let me finish this section by asking why this matters. Suppose it is 
true that the idea of attempt in most jurisdictions is more unified than 
the medley offence that I described several paragraphs back, which tries 
to understand it in terms of the mens rea that would be present for the 
successful crime. What significance should we assign to that? What reason 
do we have to think that the law works with the more unified notions, 
and hence that an account in terms of such notions is more likely to be 
accurate? And more pressing still, even if it does, why should it?
Obviously these are big questions. My answer is that insofar as the 
law is genuinely trying for an offence of attempt, as we ordinarily under-
stand it, this is what it needs to do. I have argued that the common law 
works with something like the moral equivalent of natural kinds. This is 
so for the substantial offences—murder, rape, theft, and so on, and it is 
equally true of the idea of attempt. We can work to understand those 
ideas, and to see how they fit together, which have priority, and so on. 
Sometimes we discover new ones (I have mentioned sexual harassment), 
and sometimes we come to think that those we have been using are 
mistaken (the idea of honour thankfully has a smaller role in our current 
thinking than it once did). But if the development of moral philosophy 
has shown us anything, it has shown us that attempts to throw out these 
categories and start afresh are hopeless. In this though, the law is no 
different to other kinds of thought. We are all in Neurath’s boat.27
26 Again, see Yaffe, ‘Criminal Attempts’, pp. 116–18 for discussion, and for a clear 
argument that to state an intention is not, in the relevant sense, to act on it.
27 This paper was presented at the Human Rights and the Human Mind conference in Tel 
Aviv, January 2014; thanks to Amit Pundik, my commentator there, and the audience members. 
An early version was published in the proceedings of that conference in Law and Ethics of 
Human Rights 9 (2015): 181–93. The material was subsequently presented at the Intention 
workshop at Leeds in February 2014, at the Criminal Law’s Person conference at York in 
December 2015, and at Yale in March 2017; thanks to Yair Levy, my commentator at Leeds, 
and the audience members on all those occasions. Special thanks to Tim Williamson for dis-
cussion and comments on the written version, Gideon Yaffe, Michael Moore, and the referees 
for LEHR.
